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COMES NOW, Defendant/Counter-Claimant/ Appellant, Killgore Salmon River Fruit Co. 
(hereinafter "Killgore"), by and through its attorneys of record, Sawtooth Law Offices, PLLC, and 
submits this Appellant's Reply Brief in the above-titled matter. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Notably absent from the brief of Respondents, Daryl K. and Linda L. Mullinix (hereinafter 
"Mullinix"), is that the Settlement Agreement is not binding and that Mullinix did not agree to a 
point of diversion below the Killgore point of diversion. This is because these facts are undisputed. 
Yet, the district court disregarded the Settlement Agreement and the fact that Mullinix agreed to have 
their point of diversion below the Killgore point of diversion by decreeing that Killgore must furnish 
Mullinix water from the Killgore point of diversion. Mullinix has attempted to support the decision 
of the district court because it favors their current position but it cannot be denied that the decision 
is erroneous. In fact, Mullinix's own pleadings and position taken throughout this case has been 
that they have the right to use the pipeline owned by Killgore but Mullinix were still required to 
install their own diversion below the Killgore diversion. 1 Whether to follow the facts, agreements 
of the parties, pleadings of the parties and law is not something the district court can transform into 
a discretionary decision simply because the desired result cannot be obtained based upon the facts 
and law. For this reason, Mullinix must make strained arguments to support the district court's 
decision even though none are consistent with the binding Settlement Agreement. 
1 Mullinix acknowledges that following the Settlement Agreement they acquired pipe "and even 
sent out a request for bids to install a second pipe running next to the existing pipe." Respondent's Brief, 
pg. 14. Further, Mullinix acknowledges that "[i]n keeping with the terms of the SRBA settlement 
agreement and the right to divert from Joe Creek, Mullinix designed and proposed a system to divert 
from below Killgore's existing weir." Respondent's Brief, pg. 15. There is no doubt that the binding 
Settlement Agreement required Mullinix's point of diversion below the Killgore point of diversion and 
the district court has disregarded said requirement. 
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
As referenced in Killgore's Opening Brief, the standard of review following a court trial is 
whether the district court's is supported by substantial evidence and whether legal conclusions are 
sustained by the facts found. Appellant's Brief, pgs. 17-18. Mullinix does not disagree and 
reiterates these very principles. Respondent's Brief, pgs. 16-17. Yet, in an attempt to support the 
district court's decision, again because it cannot be reconciled with the Settlement Agreement, 
Mullinix suggests that the district court's findings, conclusion and decree are discretionary decisions. 
However, the decisions, conclusions, and decree of the district court are far from discretionary and 
the district court does not have the discretion as to whether to render legal conclusions which are not 
supported by the facts found. The district court was unable to provide the relief requested by 
Mullinix because it did not conform to the evidence and law and it cannot simply sua sponte fashion 
its own relief and call it an equitable or discretionary decision. The correct standard of review is that 
which this Court has followed in numerous other decisions of bench/court trials and which is 
provided in Killgore's Opening Brief. 
Killgore disagrees that the findings, conclusions and decree of the district court following 
a court trial were discretionary decisions and subject to the standard of review for discretionary 
decisions, but even if they were for arguments' sake, the district court did not: (1) perceive them as 
discretionary as there is no mention by the district court that the decisions, conclusions or decree 
were discretionary; (2) act within the bounds of that discretion and apply the correct legal standards 
as it simply disregarded the binding Settlement Agreement, facts and law; and (3) abused the 
discretion by sua sponte fashioning relief which was inconsistent with the binding Settlement 
Agreement, the pleadings and relief requested by Mullinix, the facts presented and the law. 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. This Appeal is Not Premature as a Final Decree has been Issued. 
There is no dispute that the district court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and a Decree in this case on September 23, 2013 and that Killgore timely filed a Notice of Appeal. 
The Decree is a final judgment appealable under Rule 11 of the Idaho Appellate Rules and as in Rule 
54(a) of the I.R.C.P. In fact, the Decree itself provides: "this is a final Decree, entered after a trial 
on the merits" R. pg. 235, ,-r 5. Thus, there is no doubt that the Decree is a final appealable decree. 
Mullinix has not sought a stay of the appeal by the district court or this Court under Rule 13 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules and no such stay has been issued by the district court or this Court. 
Without such a stay, Rule 13(b )(7) of the Idaho Appellate Rules specifically provides that the district 
court continues to have authority to rule on "motions for reconsideration" during the pendency of 
an appeal. If Mullinix wanted the appeal to be stayed then it must seek such a stay, but the fact that 
Rule 13 of the Idaho Appellate Rules allows the district court to rule on motions for reconsideration 
and other motions during the pendency of an appeal does not render the appeal premature simply 
because such a motion is filed. 
Furthermore, Mullinix argues that this appeal is premature because they filed a motion for 
reconsideration on two points, one of which was summarily denied, and one of which remained 
pending as to whether Killgore must apply water to beneficial use in order to preclude Mullinix's 
use from the Killgore point of diversion and pipeline.2 The issue presented by the motion for 
2 Since Mullinix filed their Respondent's Brief, the district court did render a decision that 
Killgore must apply water to beneficial use in order to preclude Mullinix's use from the Killgore 
diversion and pipeline and required, inter alia, the parties to cooperate with the Idaho Department of 
Water Resources for purposes of measuring the water. However, these issues dealt with the 
administration and use of water within the pipeline and does not modify or amend the decision/decree of 
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reconsideration deals with the administration and use of water by Killgore and Mullinix now that 
the district court has determined that Killgore must furnish Mullinix water from the Killgore point 
of diversion and pipeline. The motion for reconsideration does not seek to alter or change the 
findings, decision and/or decree ultimately allowing Mullinix' s use of the Killgore point of diversion 
and pipeline and which is now before this Court. 
Even the district court itself fashioned its decree to provide that it "retains jurisdiction over 
this matter to ensure that the terms of this Decree are carried out. Either party may make application 
to the Court for additional relief by filing a motion with the Court under this same case number." R. 
234, ~ 4. While the district court recognized additional issues may arise concerning the 
administration and use of the water from Joe Creek given it had allowed Mullinix into a diversion 
and pipeline which they had not previously used, it did not stay, terminate or extinguish the right to 
appeal his decision to allow Mullinix's use in the first place. 
B. Article XV, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution and I.C. § 42-101 are 
Inapplicable. 
With regard to the application of Article XV, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution and LC. § 
42-101, Mullinix simply restates the relevant portions of the Constitution/statute and argues that the 
district court properly applied both. However, Mullinix fails to address the fact that the 20 acres 
which is now the Mullinix property has never received water "under a sale, rental, or distribution 
thereof." If Mullinix's property has never received water under the sale, rental or distribution, then 
there is no continuing guarantee. Mullinix has suggested that Killgore developed the land it retained 
beginning in 2000, and the contracts Killgore has entered with lot owners to maintain the system 
the district court that Killgore must furnish water to Mullinix from the Killgore point of diversion and 
pipeline. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 4 
constitute a sale or rental, something Killgore disagrees with, but it has never been suggested or 
argued that Killgore sold, rented or distributed water to Mullinix or Mullinix's predecessor for use 
on the Mullinix property. There is zero evidence in the record to suggest there has been a sale or 
rental for use and appropriation on the Mullinix property and thus it is clear that the district court 
inappropriately and incorrectly relied upon Article XV, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution and I.C. 
§42-101. 
C. Idaho Code Section 42-912 is Not Applicable. 
Mullinix misses the point made by Killgore with regard to the application of LC. § 42-912 
and completely fails to address the fact that LC. § 42-912 is inconsistent with and cannot be 
reconciled with the fact that Mullinix have their own water right and agreed to have a separate point 
of diversion below the Killgore point of diversion. This is one of the many instances where the 
district's court's decision completely ignores the Settlement Agreement and the fact that Mullinix 
have their own water right, and because it cannot be reconciled with the district court's decision, 
Mullinix chose to ignore the issue. The district court's decision that Killgore must furnish water to 
Mullinix is erroneous given the fact that Mullinix waived and relinquished any claim to be 
'·furnished" water, not that a valid one existed, when Mullinix agreed to their own separate diversion 
point below the Killgore point of diversion and procured their own water right. 
Moreover, Idaho Code § 42-912 is not intended to require a person or entity to furnish 
someone else a separately owned water right. This is why the statute states that one shall not 
contract to deliver more than such person, company or corporation has title to. Killgore does not 
have title to the water right in which Mullinix obtained in the Snake River Basin Adjudication 
(SRBA), water right number 79-14233 for .4 cfs,. and which the district court ordered to be furnished 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 5 
by Killgore to Mullinix. 
Mullinix does spend a great deal of time arguing that Killgore entered into irrigation 
agreements which allow Killgore to get reimbursed for the operation costs of the system. However, 
the point which Mullinix misses is that Killgore did not develop water rights for the purpose of sale, 
rental or distribution. It was not a canal company like some many in this State that began by 
appropriating water based upon the speculation that future users would desire to be furnished water 
from the irrigation system. Instead, Killgore, like many private landowners, appropriated and 
developed water rights and a conveyance system for their own use on their ovvn land. It clearly did 
not start as any entity which would fall under LC. § 42-912. Moreover, the fact that it began 
subdividing and selling portions of those same lands thirty-five years later does not and should not 
transform it into a entity covered under LC. § 42-912 and which allows all adjacent water right 
owners to utilize the conveyance system.3 This is no different than many subdivisions, established 
many years after the water rights for the original farm were created, with CCRs providing the sharing 
and use of water and the sharing of the operational costs of the system. These homeowners 
association may own the water right and be responsible for the operation and maintenance of the 
system, the cost of which is shared, and this does not allow every adjacent property owner with their 
own water right to require water to be furnished. 
Finally, Mullinix intimates throughout their brief that Killgore have somehow limited the use 
of water by the lot O\\<ners to ½ acre even though the agreements specifically state that they are 
3 If a private landowner can transform itself into a person or entity covered under l.C. § 42-912 
by simply subdividing property can it also reverse the transformation by dissolving or taking some other 
actions to reverse what has occurred? lt should not be transformed in the first place because LC. § 42-
912 was not intended to apply to these types of situations were the water right was developed by a private 
landowner for use on the landowner's own lands. 
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sharing the water sharing the costs similar to a homeowners association. Moreover, the lot owners 
are not limited to one-half acre as suggested by Mullinix. This is a point that Killgore has 
repeatedly explained but simply falls on deaf ears. The irrigation agreements provide that "the 
annual fee includes irrigation water for yard, and landscaping up to one half(½) acre, payable by all 
participating Lot owners." See Exhibits 33A, 33B, 33C and 33E. This is what Mullinix continues 
to myopically focus on. However, the agreements goes on to provide: 
additional costs for power, maintenance and repair will be shared by all 
participating users, on a pro rated per acre basis for the number of acres 
irrigated. For example there are eight (8) subdivided lot owners and the total 
irrigated is 40 acres. (The 40 acres does not include the first one half acre owned 
by each Lot owner). Lot A owns 3 acres and irrigates 2 acres. His share of costs 
would be 2/40ths of costs plus the annual $100.00 fee. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
This hardly limits the use to ½ acre but rather specifically indicates that the use on additional 
acres is authorized, the costs will be apportioned based upon those additional acres irrigated and 
"does not include the first one half acre owed by each Lot owner." This was explained to counsel 
during the testimony of Heather Killgore, was explained during the closing arguments but Mullinix 
continues to incorrectly suggest that the lots are limited to ½ acre. In any event, the shared use and 
shared costs should not open the door to any and all adjacent property owners to claim a right to be 
furnished their own water rights through the diversion, pipeline and conveyance system. Especially, 
when those same adjacent property owners agreed to have their own point of diversion below. 
D. Killgore is Not Precluded by Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel from 
Challenging Mullinix's Right to Use Killgore's Diversion and Pipeline. 
Mullinix's argument concerning res judicata and/or collateral estoppel is twisted and 
inconsistent to say the least. On the one hand, Mullinix suggests that the water rights decreed in the 
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SRBA pursuant to the parties Settlement Agreement preclude Killgore from asserting non-use by 
Mullinix from the diversion point and pipeline. However, on the other hand, Mullinix goes to great 
lengths to suggest that water rights and ditch rights are two separate and distinct real property 
interests and the Settlement Agreement did not determine the parties ditch and easement rights. 
Indeed, Mullinix suggests the following: 
The settlement agreement states, "[t]his is the complete agreement between the 
parties concerning the elements of the water rights at issue in these subcases and 
nothing in this agreement shall be construed as a determination or 
acknowledgment of any party's right to an easement, right-of-way or 
conveyance system." Ex. 27, ,r 7. This language is clear and unambiguous. The 
parties did not settle the right to the pipeline or conveyance system. 
Respondent's Brief, pg. 35 (emphasis in original). 
Yet, despite recognizing and asserting that the Settlement Agreement did not resolve 
easement, right-of-way and conveyance system issues, Mullinix argues that the "elements of the 
water rights at issue" results in res judicata or claim preclusion as to the ditch rights and use of the 
conveyance system. 
Mullinix is correct that water rights and ditch rights are distinct real property issues. See 
Respondent's Brief; pg. 35. Indeed, Idaho courts have consistently held that a ditch right, which is 
defined as real property under LC.§ 55-101, and the right to the water carried in the ditch may be 
owned separately. See Ada County Farmers' Irrigation Co. v. Farmers' Canal Co., 5 Idaho 793, 
799, 51 Pac. 990 (1898); Simonson v. 1\;foon, 72 Idaho 39, 47, 237 P.2d 93 (1951 ). The right to one 
does not necessarily lead to the right to the other. Swank v. Sweetwater Irr. & Power Co., 15 Idaho 
353, 360, 98 P. 297 (1908).4 Mullinix has partially decreed water rights issued by the SRBA Court 
4 With regard to Killgore's arguments concerning waiver, estoppel and !aches Mullinix similarly 
suggests that Killgore is suggesting that Mullinix as forfeited a portion of their water right. Again, it is 
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from Joe Creek and the Salmon River. However, as acknowledged by Mullinix, those water rights 
and the elements thereto do not provide Mullinix with ditch, easement, right-of-way or conveyance 
system rights. Those must be established independently according to recognized principles oflaw. 
Killgore is not barred from disputing those facts and raising issues concerning the historic use of the 
ditch, pipeline, easement, right-of-way or conveyance system simply because Mullinix has partially 
decreed water rights. As Mullinix argues, those issues were not resolved as part of the "elements 
of water rights at issue." 
Mullinix would like to suggest that since Killgore entered the Settlement Agreement and 
dropped its forfeiture argument in the SRBA that this somehow suggests there was no evidence of 
forfeiture. However, the same can be said that if Mullinix contended that they had a valid basis for 
the water right claimed then they would not have entered into a Settlement Agreement which 
provided for their point of diversion below the Killgore point of diversion and which, as recognized 
by the district court, rendered Mullinix's right inferior to that of Killgore. This is especially true for 
Mullinix' s suggestion that there was use on the Mullinix parcel as early as 1928 by Wilber Van Wey 
given the fact that neither party were eventually partially decreed water rights as far back as 19285 
and instead the priority date on the partial decrees for both the Killgore water right and the Mullinix 
water right from Joe Creek are 1965. The fact remains that the parties settled the water rights issues 
the ditch right, right to the pipeline and right to the conveyance system that Killgore suggest has been 
lost. It follows from the separable property rights in a ditch and a water right that a ditch right may lost 
and the water right is not. See In re Johnson, Appeal from Department of Reclamation, 50 Idaho 573, 
579-580, 300 P. 492 ( 1931) (holding that the ditch right may be abandoned when the water is utilized 
through another ditch). 
5 Mullinix was initially decreed a water right from Joe Creek in the SRBA with a 1928 priority 
date, but Killgore objected, and pursuant to the binding Settlement Agreement the 1928 claim was 
disallowed. See Respondent's Brief; pg. 14. 
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with a binding and enforceable Settlement Agreement and which did relinquish claims and defenses 
concerning ditch, easement and conveyance rights other than the fact that Mullinix unambiguously 
agreed that their point of diversion must be below the Killgore point of diversion. 
It is important to distinguish Mullinix' s misplaced arguments from those being made by 
Killgore. Killgore is not attacking the partially decreed water rights as suggested by Mullinix. 
Rather, Killgore is seeking to enforce the binding Settlement Agreement between the parties that the 
point of diversion for Mullinix must be below the Killgore point of diversion ( something the district 
court disregarded) and to protect its rights to its own point of diversion, pipeline and conveyance 
system which have not been historically used by Mullinix or their predecessors. Killgore' s position 
is not spiteful as suggested by Mullinix but rather has been that Mullinix can install their own point 
of diversion as agreed to in the Settlement Agreement below the Killgore point of diversion, and 
install their own pipeline and conveyance system, which diverts the water from Joe Creek which is 
not being diverted or utilized by Killgore. This is something contemplated by the Settlement 
Agreement and which Mullinix began until they abandoned. Thus, Killgore are not attacking the 
water rights themselves but rather the ditch, easement and conveyance system rights specifically 
reserved in the Settlement Agreement. 
E. Mullinix has not Established a Prior Right to Use the Killgore Diversion and 
Pipeline. 
A key point that is not addressed by Mullinix is that when the pipeline was installed in 1987, 
the diversion point from Joe Creek moved up Joe Creek several hundred feet to a new point of 
diversion so as to increase the pressure in the pipeline. (Tr. pgs. 351-352, lns. 25-8). The evidence 
is undisputed and uncontradicted that Mullinix' s property has never received water from the pipeline 
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and thus has never received water from the new point of diversion further up Joe Creek. Thus, the 
point of diversion which the district court determined must be utilized to furnish Mullinix water has 
never been used by Mullinix or Mullinix' s predecessors. The district court recognizes this in the fact 
that it concluded that Mullinix did not have easement rights from the property owner, Mr. Robinson, 
and then ordered Killgore to furnish water from their point of diversion. Mullinix does not address 
this issue and does not attempt to argue that Mullinix has a prior right to the existing point of 
diversion since it was moved in 1987 or twenty-seven years ago.6 
Instead, Mullinix argues that they have a right in the pipe pursuant to Keyser v. Morehead, 
23 Idaho 501, 130 P. 992 (1913). However, Keyser v. 1~forehead is not on point. In Keyser v. 
Morehead, both the plaintiff and defendant had rights in the original ditch or flume as co-tenants 
because they had both utilized the ditch. In fact, the decision specifically states that "[ t ]here is no 
dispute between the parties as to the respective rights of the different parties to convey water through 
the lateral from the main ditch to the lands each owned and described in the pleadings in this case." 
Id. This is distinguishable from this case as Mullinix has no right in the original_ old ditch, pipeline 
or new diversion thus has no established ditch rights or easement rights to the diversion or pipeline. 
Again, Mullinix has not asserted a co-tenancy in the ditch or pipe, and Mullinix has agreed in a 
Settlement Agreement that they will have a point of diversion below the point of diversion for the 
pipe. Thus, there is no co-tenancy which has been established or even asserted up to this point. 
6 Killgore contend that the district court was clearly erroneous in allowing Mullinix to utilize the 
diversion and pipe of Killgore given the Settlement Agreement and the requirement that Mullinix's point 
of diversion must be below Killgore's point of diversion. Killgore also contend that allowing Mullinix to 
install a diversion which connects to the Killgore pipeline is not supported by the evidence given that 
Mullinix has no easement rights, as recognized by the district court, but also has no right to the pipeline 
and the new diversion moved upstream in 1987 which has never been used by Mullinix. 
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In Keyser v. Afore/and, the defendants piped the lateral ditch in which there was no dispute 
that the plaintiffs had a right to use but the plaintiffs were not willing to share in the cost of the 
piping. In fact, the pipe was constructed with a sufficient capacity to carry both parties water. This 
is again distinguishable from this case because the pipe has never been used to irrigate the Mullinix 
property and it was not constructed to carry water to the Mullinix property. The Court in Keyser 
v. 1vforeland analyzed where there was a good faith agreement between the parties to construct the 
pipeline, and found that they agreed that the pipe was necessary, but that the plaintiff declined to 
participate or contribute to the cost of construction. In this case, there is no such agreement or 
existing co-tenancy right, but to the contrary, if anything there is a Settlement Agreement which 
provides that Mullinix will have their own water right and own point of diversion. The bottom line 
is that Keyser v. 1vforehead is not on point. If anything, the case illustrates that Mullinix is not a co-
tenant in the ditch or pipe, does not have an existing right to the ditch or pipeline and should not be 
allowed to force their way into the pipe. 
The same is true with regard to Mullinix' s reference to LC.§ 42-1207 and their argument that 
the ditch must be piped "without harming another who has an interest in the ditch." Respondent's 
Brief pg. 30. Here, Mullinix has no interest in the ditch which was piped as the evidence is clear 
that there was at most one year of use in 1966. Moreover, the ditch was piped in 1987 or twenty-
seven years ago and any claims of harm as a result of the piping would be barred by a number of 
principles of law, including, waiver, estoppel, !aches and the statute of limitations. Mullinix is 
straining to find a means to allow their use of the pipe but given the lack of historic use, the facts that 
there has been at most one year of use in the past forty-eight years, and the fact the ditch was piped 
more than twenty-seven years ago, the facts simply do not support Mullinix's strained arguments. 
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Mullinix argues that they have the a right to use the pipe because they own the servient estate 
and own the land that the pipe crosses. This argument completely misses the point. Simply being 
a servient estate owner does not entitle Mullinix to an interest in the pipe. There is no dispute that 
Killgore own and control the pipeline in question or that the Court decreed that Killgore have an 
easement to operate and maintain the pipeline. As such, Killgore have a right-of-way, recognized 
by LC. § 42-1102 which provides, inter alia, that the no encroachment shall be installed within the 
right-of-way without their wTitten consent. 
In Pioneer Irrigation District v. City of Caldwell, 153 Idaho 593, 288 P.3d 810(2012) held 
that the irrigation rights of way and easements are not exclusive unless there is an exclusive 
easement granted such as in this case. However, the Court also made it clear that a property owner 
or servient estate owner cannot simply utilize the ditch or easement without obtaining the prior 
written consentofthe owner of the right-of-way pursuant to LC.§ 42-1209, which contains the same 
language as LC.§ 42-1102 concerning encroachments and the necessity to obtain the consent of the 
right-of-way/ditch owner. In Pioneer Irrigation District v. City of Caldwell, the City was desiring 
to use the irrigation district's drainage system to convey storm water and the Court was clear that the 
written consent of the owner of the right-of-way, in this case the irrigation district, must be obtained 
before the City could do so. The Court did not hold or even suggest that the City could use the 
irrigation district's drainage system simply because the City was a servient estate owner where the 
drains crossed. In other words, simply because the irrigation right-of-way may not be exclusive 
does not mean that a servient estate owner is entitled to utilize the ditch or easement. To the 
contrary, if anything, Pioneer Irrigation District v. City of Caldwell, further demonstrates that 
Mullinix cannot interfere with the existing uses of the pipe and that he must obtain the written 
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consent of the owner of the pipeline, i.e. Killgore, before doing so. 
Additionally, the undisputed facts in this case that Killgore's easement, at least the portion 
from Joe Creek across the property owned by Robinson, is an exclusive easement. See Exhibit F. 
The exclusive easement was granted to James Killgore and it specifically stated that it included heirs, 
successors and assigns. Id. It also provided the exclusive right to construct a diversion point and 
an exclusive right to "construct, maintain and otherwise utilize, including right to ingress and egress, 
the existing irrigation canal or ditch." Id. The exclusive easement is clear, specific and 
unambiguous and such exclusive easements have been recognized by this Court. See Latham v. 
Garner, I 05 Idaho 854, 673 P.2d I 048 (1983). It is important to keep in mind that the exclusive 
easement was granted in 1972, after Mullinix's property was conveyed, and James Killgore had no 
interest in what is now the Mullinix parcel.7 Thus, there is no support for the proposition that 
Mullinix can utilize an exclusive easement simply because they are the servient estate owner. 
Moreover, the Killgore diversion and pipeline originate on property which is not owned by 
Mullinix, and which Killgore have an exclusive easement, and thus Mullinix is not the servient estate 
owner for the diversion and portion of the property for which Killgore hold the exclusive easement. 
For this section of the Killgore diversion and pipeline, Mullinix' s arguments that it can simply utilize 
the conveyance system as the servient estate owner fail. As the district court recognized, Mullinix 
has no easement rights from the property owner, and thus their arguments that they are the servient 
estate owner are inapplicable. 
7 Mullinix, like the district court, makes reference to the fact that the Mullinix property was 
conveyed by James and Josephine Killgore to Louis and Maude Weise in the 1960s and Maude Weise 
happened to be the sister of James Killgore, but clearly there had been a severance in chain of title to the 
property which is now owned by Mullinix. [n other words, the fact that Maude Weise was the sister of 
James Killgore does not retain the unity ohitle for the property. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF -PAGE 14 
F. Mullinix's Attempt to Raise Issues not raised on Cross Appeal Should Be 
Rejected. 
Mullinix contends that this Court should issue a decision which provides "guidance to the 
district court for future disputes on the issue of beneficial use of the parties' water rights." First, this 
issue was not raised on cross-appeal by Mullinix and requests an advisory opinion from this Court. 
The Idaho Supreme Court will not issue an advisory opinion in order to avoid a future issue. State 
v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 9, 232 P.3d 327, 330 (2010). Second, it assumes evidence which is not 
correct such as the assertion that lot owners are only allowed to use water on one-half acre. As 
discussed, supra, the irrigation agreements do not restrict such use as incorrectly suggested by 
Mullinix. Third, the issue is moot given that the district court recently rendered a decision on the 
very issue Mullinix seeks this Court's guidance. Finally, the issue of administration and use by the 
parties within the Killgore point of diversion, pipeline and conveyance system is moot if the Court 
agrees that the district court erroneously disregarded the Settlement Agreement and Killgore is not 
required to furnish Mullinix water from its point of diversion and pipeline. Mullinix have their own 
water right and can install their own separate di version and conveyance system as was contemplated 
by the Settlement Agreement and as intended by Mullinix when they purchased pipe and sought bids 
to install their own conveyance system.8 Mullinix would then be in a position to divert any water 
not diverted by Killgore and any disputes would be involve an administration of water rights, which 
would involve the Idaho Department of Water Resources, and not a dispute concerning the operation, 
8 It is also important to keep in mind that Mullinix's property is not without water if not allowed 
to use the Killgore point of diversion and pipeline. Mullinix would like to use the diversion, pipeline and 
system owned and installed by Killgore but Mullinix have a separate water right from the Salmon River 
to divert on their property. Thus, in addition to the right to install their own diversion below the Killgore 
diversion on Joe Creek, Mullinix can and do utilize water from the Salmon River. 
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maintenance and use of the same conveyance system. 
G. Mullinix Should Not be Awarded Attorney Fees or Costs on Appeal. 
As set forth herein and in Killgore' s Opening Brief, Killgore contend that the district court's 
decision and decree should be reversed and thus it would be the prevailing party on appeal. 
However, for arguments' sake and in the alternative this Court does not reverse the district court, 
Mullinix should not be entitled to attorney fees on appeal under LC. § 12-121 given the district 
court's disregard for the evidence presented, including the binding Settlement Agreement, and the 
district court's attempt to create a remedy which was not plead by Mullinix nor is it supported by 
evidence and law. Killgore is not simply second guessing the district court as suggested by Mullinix 
but rather is seeking that the district court to follow the evidence presented and law applicable to the 
case. 9 For the reasons stated herein and in Killgore' s Opening Brief, attorney fees on appeal are not 
appropriate in this case under LC. § 12-121 or any other rule or statute. 
H. Killgore did not Tortiously Injure the Property of Mullinix by Disconnecting 
Mullinix's Illegal and Unauthorized Diversions 
With regard to whether Killgore tortiously injured the property of Mullinix by disconnecting 
their illegal and unauthorized connections, Killgore refers the Court to its Opening Brief and restated 
that Killgore had the right to self help to disconnect the unauthorized connections when Mullinix 
acknowledges they did not install a separate point of diversion below the Killgore point of diversion 
as agreed in the Settlement Agreement. Killgore sent notices to Mullinix indicating that they had 
no right to connect to the pipeline, Mullinix had agreed to have a point of diversion below the 
9 Mui linix also sought attorney fees from the district court under LC. § 12-121 and the district 
court summarily denied the claim based upon the fact that Mullinix penned letters to Killgore suggesting 
Mullinix did not have the legal basis to divert from the Killgore pipe. (Tr. pgs. l 12-122, Ins. 13-6); see 
also Exhibit 35 wherein Mullinix apologized for their actions. 
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Killgore point of diversion, and Mullinix still connected to the pipeline to divert water without the 
knowledge or consent of Killgore. See Pioneer Irrigation District v. City of Caldwell, supra 
(holding that LC.§ 42-1209 did not modify an easement holders common law right to self help). 
I. Mullinix is Not the Prevailing Party If This Court Reverses or Remands this 
Matter. 
Finally, with regard to whether Mullinix was the prevailing party, Killgore again refers the 
Court to its Opening Brief and restate that should this Court reverse the decision of the district court 
and/or remand the matter then Mullinix would no longer be the prevailing party and the award of 
costs to Mullinix must be vacated. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Killgore again respectfully requests that the district court's 
decision be reversed with respect to its decision that Mullinix has the right to use the diversion works 
or pipeline owned and controlled by Killgore. Further, Mullinix has no prior right to the diversion 
works or pipeline owned by Killgore, or, in the alternative, waived and abandoned any such right 
when they executed the Settlement Agreement in which they unambiguously agreed to have a point 
of diversion inferior and below the Killgore point of diversion. The district court erroneously 
concluded that Mullinix has a right to use the Killgore diversion and/or pipeline under Article XV, 
Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution or LC. § 42-101 because, again, Mullinix had no prior right 
which must be guaranteed. The district court also erroneously concluded that LC. § 42-912 is 
applicable to the facts and circumstances in this case. Mullinix have their O\\TI water right, agreed 
it would be below the point of diversion of Killgore, and cannot now claim they must be furnished 
their water right under LC. § 42-912. The district court's decision that Killgore tortiously injured 
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Mullinix by disconnecting their illegal and unauthorized connections was in error and should be 
reversed. Finally, the district court's decision that Mullinix was the prevailing party and should be 
awarded costs should be reversed. 
DATED this of July, 2014. 
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